When listening to a sentence describing an interaction with a manipulable object, understanding the actor's intentions is shown to have a striking influence on action representations evoked during comprehension. Subjects performed a cued reach and grasp response while listening to a context sentence. Responses were primed when they were consistent with the proximal intention of an actor (John lifted the cell-phone…), but this effect was evanescent and appeared only when sentences mentioned the proximal intention first. When the sentence structure was changed to mention the distal intention first (To clear the shelf…) , priming effects were no longer context-specific and actions pertaining to the function of an object were clearly favored. These results are not compatible with a straightforward mental-simulation account of sentence comprehension, but instead reflect a hierarchy of intentions distinguishing how and why actions are performed.
It is a remarkable fact that regions of the motor cortex are activated by language tasks that require the comprehension of action words like run, and of nouns denoting manipulable objects like cell-phone. Understanding the implications of this widely reported phenomenon of motor resonance (for a review see Willems & Hagoort, 2007) remains a challenge for current theoretical accounts of word comprehension. On one interpretation, the evidence suggests that the motor system plays a crucial role in establishing the meaning of a word. To understand a word like sneeze, for example, may require that we consult a record of actions (and experiences) previously associated with the word (Barsalou, 2008 (Barsalou, , 2009 ). The alternative, opposing viewpoint, is that actions are evoked as an automatic by-product of language: we immediately derive an action representation after we have determined the meaning of a word (Mahon & Caramazza, 2008) .
In this article, we pursue a crucial issue relevant to the computational role of motor representations in language processing. To what extent does context modulate the action representations evoked by a word? The question has a fundamental bearing on the nature of the interaction between language and the motor -
--------------------------------------------system. Consider for example, the different actions implied by the following sentences: (1) John lifted the cell-phone to clear the shelf. (2) John used the cell-phone to contact his mother.
The first sentence refers to an action that involves picking up and moving the object, whereas the second sentence denotes the skilled use of a cell-phone according to its proper function. We will term the action representation consistent with grasping an object to lift and move it as volumetric (V), whereas the functional (F) action representation concerns the use of an object in accordance with its intended function (Bub, Masson, & Cree, 2008) . V-and F-grasps refer to the goal postures used by agents to carry out very different intentions with the same object; lifting to move an object versus implementing its function (e.g., JohnsonFrey, 2004; Napier, 1993) . We do not imply by our use of these terms that an F-grasp does not entail features of an object's shape, only that the two grasp types fundamentally differ in the goals that lead to their execution. Although for many objects the relevant Fand V-grasps are virtually identical (e.g., drinking from and putting away a glass involve nearly the same grasp), we are primarily interested in cases where these two actions are quite distinct (e.g., using versus picking up a spray-can). Objects of the latter type allow us to examine the potentially different dynamics of the two action types. A context that unambiguously implies that objects are being interacted with volumetrically (sentence 1 above) will be referred to as a V-context, and a context that clearly denotes a functional interaction will be termed an F-context.
How does an F-or V-context sentence modulate grasp representations evoked by words denoting everyday manipulable objects like pencil and spraycan? The issue has deep implications concerning the nature of motor resonance. The lack of any modulating influence of sentence context would provide evidence that motor representations automatically evoked by words can be dissociated from the meaning of sentences that describe different kinds of actions being applied to objects. Such a result would imply that the motor system plays a highly constrained role in language comprehension, one that does not extend to the thematic relationship between words forming a sentence. If context does have a modulating influence, then additional questions arise; such as, what constraints might exist on the nature of these contextual effects as the meaning of a sentence unfolds in real time?
A modest amount of previous research (Raposo, Moss, Stamatakis, & Tyler, 2009; Rueschemeyer, Brass, & Friederici, 2007) does indicate that motor resonance can be modulated by context but leaves unresolved a number of fundamental issues that motivate the present article. Some of these have already been raised by van Dam, Rueschemeyer, Lindemann, and Bekkering (2010b) who considered how actions evoked in response to a target word like cup might be altered by a prime (another word) that suggested either using (e.g. thirst) or lifting to move (e.g. sink) the object. A planned movement of the hand (toward or away from the body) was either congruent or incongruent with a motor representation evoked by the target word. For example, a movement toward the body in response to cup is congruent with the contextdependent action given thirst as a prime but incongruent when cup occurs in the context of sink. Congruency affected reaction time to the target word if the prime denoted a functional interaction. Interestingly, however, no such effect was observed when the context implied another kind of motor interaction; for example, there was no evidence that the word cup primed by sink evoked a movement away from the body.
Van Dam et al. (2010b) offered two possible reasons for this asymmetry. They speculated that motor representations may not be evoked at all in a context that does not specify the conventional use of an object (e.g., in a context that we have referred to as volumetric rather than functional). Alternatively, the word cup might evoke a functional as well as a volumetric action when the context implies lifting to move (as opposed to using) an object, presumably because the F-grasp is automatically evoked by the meaning of a word, even though the context implies a different action representation. Since the procedure developed by van Dam et al. (2010b) could measure effects of motor resonance only on the direction of movement toward or away from the body, "… activation of two opposite motor programs might have resulted in a null effect for trials in which properties unrelated to the functional use of the object are emphasized. In this scenario, the priming effect of movement preparation on lexical access is canceled out, because motor codes underlying two opposing movements are activated simultaneously" (p. 5).
An important goal of the present article is to uncover which motor representations--even potentially competing representations--are generated in a sentence context that emphasizes the volumetric or the functional properties of an object (e.g., John lifted the cell-phone to clear the shelf; John used the cell-phone to text his girlfriend). Does motor resonance straightforwardly reflect the actions implied by the sentence or is there a deeper set of principles that determines the relationship between context and evoked action representations? Linked to this difficult issue is a further question, also raised by van Dam et al. (2010b) . They ask whether motor resonance in word and sentence comprehension occurs "… because the person voluntarily images the functional use of the referent object, after the meaning of the object word is already understood" (p. 5). The alternative is that action representations are automatically evoked, either as an integral part of the language comprehension process, or as an involuntary by-product.
Distinguishing Implicit Simulation and Motor Imagery
In further considering this issue, we draw upon a distinction emphasized by Barsalou (2008;  but also by Kent & Lamberts, 2008 , Gallese, 2003 , and more recently by Moulton & Kosslyn, 2009 ) between motor imagery and an alternative form of mental simulation which is implicit. According to Barsalou, "… whereas mental imagery typically results from deliberate attempts to construct conscious representations in working memory, other forms of simulation often appear to become active automatically and unconsciously outside working memory" (p. 619). Similarly, Moulton and Kosslyn raised the possibility that some forms of mental simulation do not rely on mental imagery. Consistent with Barsalou's proposal, this type of simulation is automatic and unconscious and is referred to as implicit simulation by Moulton and Kosslyn, who suggested that it may contribute to implicit memory, high-level perception, and language comprehension (see Pulvermüller, 2005) .
A considerable body of evidence indicates that instructions to engage in motor imagery activate neural circuits that are also engaged when subjects physically carry out the same action (Jeannerod, 1994 (Jeannerod, , 2001 . For example, Ehrsson, Geyer, and Naito (2003) instructed subjects to flex/extend their right fingers or toes, or to produce horizontal movements of the tongue. Using functional magnetic resonance imaging (fMRI), it was shown that these different tasks served to define somatotopic representations in the motor cortex. Subjects then imagined carrying out the motor tasks exactly as they had performed them overtly, but without producing any physical movement. Imagery of finger movements activated the hand region of the contralateral primary motor cortex, whereas mentally imaging movements of the foot or tongue likewise activated their corresponding representations in somatotopically organized regions.
Are motor representations evoked by words or sentences the result of implicit mental simulation or mental imagery? Because both entail some form of covert reenactment, what precisely is the difference between these alternatives as possible sources of motor resonance? A recent attempt using fMRI to distinguish between mental imagery and simulation as possible sources of motor resonance in language comprehension was conducted by Willems, Toni, Hagoort, and Casasanto (2010) . Subjects attended to the meaning of individual words, either by carrying out a lexical decision task or by actively imagining themselves performing the movement implied by the word. Verbs referring to hand actions (e.g., throw) yielded activation in the primary motor cortex (M1) when subjects engaged in motor imagery but not when they made lexical decisions (verbs like kneel, that did not implicate hand actions, served as a control condition).
Activation was also observed in areas of the premotor cortex that was specific to verbs denoting hand actions, for both imagery and lexical decision tasks. These two tasks affected different parts of the premotor cortex and there was no overlap or any correlation between the regions activated in the two tasks. The authors affirm, given this evidence, the possibility that different types of motor representations are involved in mental imagery and mental simulation.
Some methodological difficulties arise in the above fMRI study, unfortunately, that make it difficult to infer the relative timing of motor representations evoked in the lexical decision and reading tasks. As van Dam, Rueschemeyer, and Bekkering (2010a) have pointed out, motor resonance effects in lexical decisions were assessed by Willems et al. (2010) for 1.5 seconds starting from the onset of a word. The effects of motor imagery, however, were evaluated only after the subjects had read the word then closed their eyes (to signal that they had started to imagine the action), and measurement of cortical activity continued from this initial point for about 5 s. Thus, the imagery task captured motor representations that endure long after the word has been understood, but the same task--given the measurement techniques adopted--was quite insensitive to other less durable motor representations that may be evoked shortly after word onset. We do not know, then, how two different instructional sets, one that emphasizes motor imagery and the other simply requiring attention to meaning, might alter the overall time-course of motor resonance as the influence of context builds during sentence comprehension.
The Temporal Dynamics of Context Effects on Motor Resonance
The previous section establishes the point, also noted by van Dam et al. (2010b) , that "For a better understanding of the exact nature of the interaction between context and embodied word processing, we need to further investigate the temporal dynamics of the observed context effects" (p. 5). In this article, we seek to clarify how context influences the evocation of hand action representations, and how long such contextual effects, where obtained, persist as the sentence is processed in real time. More specifically, if we know with some degree of confidence and precision the temporal dynamics of the F-and V-grasp to an auditory word like cell-phone presented on its own (i.e., without any sentence context), then how is this dynamic pattern altered by context? As already suggested, there is a strong possibility (which indeed we will confirm) that context effects may depend crucially on the mental set of the listener; whether he or she simply attends to the meaning of the sentence or engages in mental imagery while listening. In the latter situation, we assume--along with others (Barsalou, 2008; Gallese, 2003; Kent & Lamberts; 2008) --that motor imagery is driven by deliberately constructing an explicit representation of action in working memory. By contrast, some forms of mental simulation, as noted above, are assumed to be implicit and automatic, and may reflect processes more directly linked to sentence comprehension (Moulton & Kosslyn, 2009 ). In the next section we further consider the possibility that a distinction exists between the implicit mental simulation and mental imagery of a sentence describing either a functional or volumetric interaction with a manipulable object.
Goal Structure, Motor Representations, and Sentence Context Effects
What differences might we expect in the temporal dynamics of an F-or V-grasp when listeners are asked either to simply comprehend a sentence or, instead, to actively form a mental image of the action conveyed, and how might this evidence provide us with clues on the functional role of motor representations in sentence processing? Consider, for example, the sentence John lifted the cell-phone to clear the shelf. The motor intention is expressed in the form: <Someone carried out action X>, followed by the stated goal of the action <To accomplish purpose Y>. The first part of the sentence deals with what we refer to as a the proximal intention, that is, a physical act, the content of which can be simply expressed as John is doing X. The second part of the sentence furnishes the reason for the action, or the distal intention. It is noteworthy that distal intentions can never be directly expressed in the physical representation of an action. For instance, a motor representation of the grasp used to lift a cellphone from a surface does not in itself disclose the reason behind the action. John may lift the cell-phone because he wishes to take it with him as he leaves for work, or because he intends to use it as a paper weight, or because he wishes to clear the shelf, or for that matter, because he wishes to use it. Conversely, a statement referring to the distal intention behind an action leaves unspecified the means by which the intended action is accomplished. We do not know what John must do in any detail if he intends to clear the shelf unless we know the objects on its surface that afford particular grasp actions. Understanding what is specifically implied by "clearing a shelf", then, can be arrived at only by integrating the proximal intention described at the beginning of the sentence with the distal intention revealed some time later.
A motor image that represents the meaning of a sentence describing an action like clearing a shelf surely demands this form of integration. We cannot imagine clearing a shelf (or at least, we cannot imagine the act in any detail) unless we include a description of the physical action used to accomplish the goal. We infer, then, that generating a motor image of John lifted the cell-phone to clear the shelf would include a description of how the object is grasped when carrying out the distal intention referred to in the last part of the sentence. If motor resonance effects due to mental imagery reflect an active depiction of the intended goal expressed in the sentence, then it follows that contextspecific representations should be observed both in response to the manipulable object and while processing the final clause of the sentence, when the distal intention is revealed.
Is there a different argument required for implicit mental simulation, when listeners only attend to the meaning of a sentence, without instructions to engage in mental imagery? To address this question, we turn to a theoretical framework originally developed by Vallacher and Wegner (1987) , who adduce a number of principles to explain how agents dynamically interpret their own actions. We contend that these same principles apply not only to listeners' interpretation of their self-generated actions as they occur in real time, but also to the states that listeners represent when attending to the meaning of a sentence describing the actions of other agents. Using a term borrowed from Vallacher and Wegner, we will refer to the organized hierarchy of goal states underlying an action as its identity structure. The lower level of identity in the action hierarchy concerns the details of an action (i.e., how the proximal intention is accomplished). A higher level identity concerns a more abstract understanding of action: why the action is carried out and its resultant effects. These two levels of identification correspond, respectively, to the proximal and distal goals of a motor intention.
Every action has a prepotent identity that is maintained over time. Vallacher and Kaufman (1996) argue that the conceptual representation of an action directed at a proximal goal is inherently unstable, so that we typically emphasize a distal goal when we interpret our own actions (see also, Vallacher, 1989 Vallacher, , 1993 . We contend that there is likewise a natural tendency in the listener to attend to distal rather than proximal goal states when evaluating an action described in a sentence. This argument may seem counterintuitive: why should knowing the reason for an action preempt an explicit representation of the action itself?
Surprisingly, the idea holds considerable plausibility on theoretical as well as empirical grounds. From the perspective of dynamic systems theory (Abraham, Abraham, & Shaw, 1990) , behavior is determined not only by the internal states of a complex system but by ongoing feedback from the environment (see also Vallacher & Wegner, 1987) . A distal intention, according to this framework, generates not one specific outcome but a more general bias in the motor system to produce a range of possible actions consistent with the agent's behavioral repertoire. Constraints afforded by the dynamics of the world then combine with these initial motor states to progressively and automatically narrow the behavioral options over time until only one course of action is left. As Juarrero (2002) writes in applying this framework to a philosophical treatment of human intentions, "Given the prior [distal] intention... and previously established contextual constraints, empirical circumstances will elicit the appropriate behavior... And so the agent just acts intentionally without ever having explicitly formed a proximate intention to perform that particular acttoken" (p. 198) .
The claim that a distal (i.e., prior) intention establishes a goal state that does not represent a specific course of action obtains remarkable support from neurophysiological evidence. Baumann, Fluet, and Scherberger (2009) recorded from single cells in the anterior intraparietal (AIP) cortex of the macaque during a delayed grasping task, in which the primate was trained to apply a power or precision grasp to an object (a handle). The type of grasp (power versus precision) to be applied on a given trial was cued by a color (green for a power grip, white for a precision grip) presented either before or after the handle was made visible. When the handle was displayed in advance of the color cue, neurons encoding both power and precision grips were activated until the presentation of the color instructed the appropriate action. In contrast, when the color cue occurred first, grasp type information was only weakly represented in AIP but was strongly encoded as soon as the handle became visible. The color cue on its own, then, did not evoke a particular grasp type in advance of the object, despite the fact that the association between color and action was unambiguously established through intensive training. This outcome, unexpected as it may appear, makes good sense if we consider the intentional status of the color cue. After being deprived of liquid before testing and recording sessions, the distal goal from the monkey's perspective is to obtain much-needed juice by means of a correct grasp response on each trial. As we have argued, the distal intention--evoked by the color cue--of quenching one's thirst is not associated with a specific action representation in AIP, but requires the additional constraint of a physical object to evoke a contextually determined reach and grasp action.
Consider again the sentence John lifted the cellphone to clear the shelf. The proximal goal--the act of lifting to move rather than using a cell-phone--demands a V-grasp instead of an F-grasp. If context plays a role in motor resonance, we should find that at some point during sentence processing identification of the proximal goal will evoke an action representation consistent with the meaning of the sentence: the proximal act described clearly involves lifting--not using--a cell-phone, so that a V-grasp should be more strongly implied than an F-grasp. We have noted, however, that the identity of a proximal goal tends to give way to the distal goal as the preferred internal description of an action. The level of abstraction representing a distal goal requires no specific grasp type. Under normal listening conditions, then, for any V-context of the form <John carried out proximal goal X to accomplish distal goal Y> the V-grasp--initially evoked by the proximal goal described in the first part of the sentence--should dissipate rapidly as the identity of the distal goal becomes prepotent.
The evanescence of the proximal goal as a conceptual representation under normal listening conditions, and the preference to identify an action at the level of a distal goal, lead to the possibility of an interesting empirical distinction between implicit simulation and mental imagery. Recall that motor imagery necessarily entails a representation of the details of an action. We contend that it is not possible to construct a durable mental image of an action's identity structure without including a durable representation of the proximal act that leads to the accomplishment of a distal goal. Constructing a mental image of a sentence of the form <John carried out proximal goal X to accomplish distal goal Y> should therefore evoke a context-specific form of motor resonance that is sustained over the duration of the sentence. In contrast, an implicit simulation of the described action--rather than a mental image--occurs automatically as part of sentence comprehension, and will produce a different dynamic pattern. The motor representation of a proximal goal should be fleetingly evoked, but the prepotency of the distal goal should diminish this activation as the meaning of the sentence unfolds.
The argument we have just advanced can be further developed to yield another more striking prediction. The format of our example sentence presents the proximal goal first, then the distal goal. Thus, John lifted the cell-phone to clear the shelf evokes a V-grasp briefly, we contend, as the action denoted by the main clause is identified, which quickly dissipates as the distal goal gains prepotency. Consider now the same sentence with the distal goal occurring first: To clear the shelf John lifted the cell-phone. Under normal listening conditions (and without any contribution of mental imagery) the immediate emphasis of the distal goal will preempt the motor representations entailed by the proximal goal. Remarkably, if this assumption is correct, we should find that the sentence--which unambiguously implies lifting rather than using an object--does not evoke a context-specific action representation. Let us explicitly restate the prediction to emphasize its novelty: A sentence like John lifted the cell-phone to clear the shelf should briefly evoke a context-specific representation of the implied action (a V-grasp occurs more strongly than the F-grasp) at some time-point shortly after the word cell-phone is presented, which will dissipate rapidly as the distal goal in the latter part of the sentence preempts the identity of the proximal goal. Simply altering the order of the sentence constituents--so that the distal goal occurs first--will abolish any effects of context on the evocation of the V-grasp to the word cell-phone, even though the meaning of the sentence clearly indicates that the intended action is to lift rather than use the object. The listener is immediately informed of the distal goal and the prepotency of this level of representation obliterates any motor activation driven by the proximal goal.
This argument, if correct, affords an additional means of empirically distinguishing between motor imagery and implicit motor simulation. The mental image of an action described in a sentence demands a representation of the way a particular goal is accomplished. Thus, it is not possible to image the action of picking up a calculator to clear a shelf without explicitly representing the hand movements associated with the proximal goal in working memory. It follows that simply attending to the meaning of a sentence will show (a) particular effects of goal order on context specificity and (b) short-lived contextual effects if observed, whereas a mental image of the action will yield more durable context-specific effects that are not influenced by goal order.
Assessing the Time Course of F-and V-Grasps
In a related article, we described a methodology that allowed us to track the evocation of an F-or Vgrasp to an auditory word in real time (Bub & Masson, in press ). We briefly summarize this methodology, as well as the evidence obtained on the temporal dynamics of action representations induced shortly after the onset of a word like cell-phone. Subjects were trained to produce speeded reach and grasp actions using an apparatus that comprised a number of response elements. The cue to act was the grey-scale image of a hand matching the final grasp posture assigned to a particular element, taken from a first-person perspective. The motor task is quite straightforward and subjects readily learn to produce the correct response to each visual cue. Concurrent with the motor task, subjects must attend to an auditory word. Presentation of the visual cue is time locked to the onset of the auditory word. Assume that at some point after the onset of the word, an internally generated motor representation of an F-or V-grasp is triggered such that it overlaps in time with the cued action. The latter is designed either to resemble the F-or V-grasp evoked by the word (related trials) or to have no such resemblance (unrelated trials). If words evoke an F-or V-grasp, motor priming effects on the cued action should be observed; speeded performance should differ between related and unrelated trials. The timing of the visual cue relative to word onset affords a measure of how quickly an F-or V-grasp is elicited. Priming of actions cued near the beginning segment of a word implies faster accrual of a motor representation than corresponding effects obtained nearer the word's final segment.
Our approach revealed that both V-and F-grasps are triggered as the word is processed in real time. It is perhaps surprising that auditory words, as well as visual objects, can elicit a V-grasp. According to one view, the action for lifting to move an object is derived online from the visible surfaces of an object, and there are no components of this motor representation stored in long-term memory (Buxbaum & Kalénine, 2010; Fridman et al., 2006; Glover, 2004; Johnson-Frey, 2004; Pisella, Binkofski, Lasek, Toni, & Rossetti, 2006; Vingerhoets, Acke, Vandemaele & Achten, 2009 ). We have good evidence against this conjecture. The meaning of a word automatically yields a V-grasp, albeit to a lesser extent than an F-grasp. The weaker activation of the V-grasp compared to the F-grasp makes sense. Without the presence of a visual object, shape-based (volumetric) information is not directly available and must be retrieved from memory. The Fgrasp is more strongly activated and dominates the Vgrasp, building over time as the V-grasp fades away. Fdominance, it should be noted, is particular to words. We have observed no such asymmetry between F-and V-grasps induced by images of manipulable objects (e.g., Bub & Masson, 2006; Bub et al., 2008) .
In the experiments reported here, we first establish the time course of context-specific priming of F-and Vgrasps when sentence contexts describe a functional or a volumetric action applied to a manipulable object and the sentence structure is such that the proximal goal is mentioned first. When subjects have the goal of simply understanding the sentence content, priming effects are context-specific, but short-lived (Experiment 1). When the goal is shifted to one of pantomiming the action described in the context sentence (thereby inducing mental imagery), more sustained contextually relevant action priming is observed (Experiment 2). We then examine V-contexts in which the distal goal is mentioned first and show that under these conditions, normal comprehension processes strongly elicit functional action representations whereas volumetric representations are at best weakly activated (Experiments 3-5).
In other words, despite the unambiguous implication of a volumetric action, the listener evokes the action representation typically associated with the word in isolation (Bub & Masson, in press); context does not modulate the evocation of action representations. Finally, when motor imagery is again induced by the requirement to pantomime the action described in a V-context, V-grasps are primed, even though the sentence structure presents the distal goal first (Experiment 6).
Experiment 1
Evidently, an auditory word like cell-phone, divorced from contextual influences, automatically triggers multiple action representations resulting in a form of biased competition (Pastor-Bernier & Cisek, 2011) that is ultimately resolved in favor of an F-grasp. A fundamental question is whether sentence context has any modulatory influence on this dynamic flow of events. The meaning of a sentence like John picked up the cell-phone to clear the shelf implies an action consistent with lifting rather than using the object. If motor resonance is not just the outcome of an inflexible association between words and actions but relates in some way to the combined meaning of words in a sentence, we would indeed expect to find that context significantly alters the expression of F-and V-grasps. Might the dominance of an F-grasp be reduced or even reversed by a V-context? If so, how would the effect of sentence context manifest over time? Changes in the temporal dynamics of an F-or V-grasp as the meaning of a sentence unfolds would offer valuable clues on the computational role of motor representations.
Method
Subjects. One hundred twenty students at the University of Victoria participated in the experiment for extra credit in an undergraduate psychology course. Twenty-four subjects were randomly assigned to each of five cue presentation conditions. Materials and apparatus. The three F-grasps and three V-grasps used in the experiments reported by Bub and Masson (in press) were also used in the experiments we report. Functional and volumetric actions were paired so that one action of each type was relevant to a set of four different objects. For example, a functional action consisting of a writing posture and a volumetric action involving a precision grip with the palm facing downward were related to these objects: crayon, marker, pen, and pencil. Twelve different objects were used in all (see Bub and Masson, in press , for a complete list of actions and their related objects).
A set of 288 critical sentences were constructed, using the general surface structure form of subject, verb (used/lifted), object, final clause. Examples are: (3) Irene used the pencil to solve math problems. (4) Matthew lifted the pen and passed it to his teacher. Half of the sentences contained the verb used, implying a functional interaction with an object, and the other half contained the verb lifted, implying a volumetric interaction. We refer to these sentence contexts as functional and volumetric, respectively. Twelve sentence contexts of each type were constructed for each of the 12 objects, yielding 288 critical sentences. A comprehension question was constructed for 72 of the critical sentences (25%). Some of these questions referred to information contained in one or the other of the two clauses of a sentence, or they required integration of information across the two clauses. Example questions, corresponding to sample sentences (3) and (4) above, are: (5) Why was the pencil used? (6) Who lifted the pen? An additional set of 24 practice sentences were constructed using the same surface structure, verbs, and objects as the critical sentences. A digital audio recording was made of a female native English speaker reading each sentence.
Critical sentence-action pairs were created by randomly assigning the six actions to the 288 critical sentences with the constraint that each action was assigned to two sentences within each of the 24 sets of 12 sentences defined by context type (functional or volumetric) and object (crayon, marker, etc.). Thus, two of the 12 sentences describing someone using a crayon were paired with a writing posture, two were paired with the downward facing precision grip, and so on. This arrangement ensured that each verb-object combination was tested equally often with each of the six actions. It also meant that the sentence context was completely non-predictive with respect to the action that would be cued. Two different assignments were made, resulting in two lists of 288 sentence-action pairs. Half of the subjects in each cue location condition were randomly assigned to be tested with one list and the remaining subjects were tested with the other list.
Digital grayscale photographs of a hand making each of the six actions were used as cues to signal the action that was to be produced on each trial. Righthanded and left-handed versions of each hand cue were made so that subjects with either dominant hand could be tested. Subjects made their responses by grasping an element of a response apparatus. The apparatus held six different elements, one for each of the hand actions that was tested. The elements were fitted to a curved base that allowed them to be positioned in a semi-circle in front of the subject so that each element was within easy reach (see Figure 1 of Bub & Masson, in press ). The positions of the elements in the base were varied across subjects. The apparatus was made of aluminum and a weak electrical field passed through it so that contact by a human hand broke the circuit and signaled that a response had been completed. The visual hand cues and auditory recordings of sentences were presented using a Macintosh desktop computer equipped with two monitors and a set of headphones worn by the subject. Task instructions and visual stimuli were displayed for the subject on one monitor. The other monitor was visible only to the experimenter and showed the target response that was to be made on each trial, allowing the experimenter to record the accuracy of responses.
Procedure. Each subject was tested individually in a quiet room. The subject was seated with a button box immediately in front of him or her and the response apparatus was placed just beyond that. The monitor was situated about 50 cm from the subject. The subject initiated each trial by pressing and holding down one of the buttons on the button box with the index finger of his or her dominant hand.
Subjects first received a block of training trials in which only a visual hand cue was presented and a speeded reach and grasp response was made. These trials gave the subjects an opportunity to learn which hand action was to be made in response to each cue and which response element was to be used for that action. After this training, subjects were given 24 practice trials followed by 288 critical trials in which the visual hand cue was accompanied by a sentence presented binaurally over headphones.
Five different cue presentation locations were used, with a different group of subjects tested in each cue presentation condition. The cue presentations occurred at points that were defined relative to the enunciation of the manipulable object mentioned in each sentence and relative to the subsequent clause.
Three of the locations were synchronized with the manipulable object and were presented at the onset, middle, or end of the word. On average, the onset cue location occurred 1,137 ms into the enunciation of the sentence context, the middle cue occurred at 1,441 ms, and the end cue occurred at 1,745 ms. The other two cue locations were the middle of the clause following the manipulable object and the very end of the sentence. On average, the mid-clause cue occurred 2,420 ms into the enunciation of the sentence context (675 ms after the critical object had been spoken), and the end-of-sentence cue occurred 3,096 ms after the beginning of sentence enunciation (1,351 ms after the critical object).
To ensure that subjects attended to the auditory sentences, on a randomly determined 25% of the trials they were given a comprehension question to answer. The question appeared on the subject's monitor after the reach and grasp response had been completed. The subject provided an oral answer then moved on to the next trial. The experimenter made key presses to classify hand actions as correct, incorrect (the wrong action was performed), or spoiled (e.g., lifting the response hand prior to the hand cue resulted in termination of the trial), and to classify answers to probe questions as correct or incorrect.
Results
Errors (M = 0.5%) and spoils (M = 0.2%) were rare and many subjects made no errors (48%) or no spoils (62%) at all. Therefore, we do not report any inferential analyses based on these measures. Response times were defined as the time between onset of the hand cue to the moment the subject's hand contacted the response apparatus (as determined by when the electric current was disrupted). Values less than 200 ms were excluded as being due to mechanical failure. Response times greater than 3,000 ms were excluded as outliers. This limit was chosen so that fewer than 0.5% of trials would be omitted (Ulrich & Miller, 1994) . Subjects correctly answered the comprehension questions on an average of 97.7% of the trials.
Data analysis was carried out using the Bayesian approximation procedure proposed by Wagenmakers (2007; see also Masson, 2011) .
This procedure provides an estimate of the Bayesian posterior odds (using the Bayesian information criterion, BIC) that the observed data favor one model over another. Models are defined by the pattern of effects that are assumed to hold. For example, one model may assume a null effect of a factor and the competing model would assume that the factor has a real effect.
Alternatively, two competing models may assume different patterns of effects, with neither conforming to the standard null hypothesis. For example, one model may assume that only main effects are present in a factorial design and a competing model may assume that an interaction is present. On the assumption that errors of measurement are normally distributed, as with the analysis of variance (ANOVA), the posterior odds are estimated using the sums of squares computed using ANOVA (Wagenmakers, 2007) . Posterior odds can be converted to conditional probabilities, which we report as p BIC .
These reported values quantify the degree of support favoring either the null (no effect is present) or the alternative hypothesis (effect is present), given the obtained data. The conditional probabilities for two competing models are complementary in that they sum to 1.0.
A system for characterizing the strength of evidence associated with ranges of values of these probabilities was suggested by Raftery (1995) : .50-.75 = weak; .75-.95 = positive; .95-.99 = strong; > .99 = very strong. We use that system when describing the strength of evidence for effects reported here. To anchor these analysis in a foundation that is likely to be more familiar to the reader, we note that in model comparisons where we report that a model that assumes an effect is preferred to a model that assumes not effect (the null model), our results are significant at least at the usual .05 criterion and frequently at the .01 criterion. Moreover, means of response times and priming effects are plotted along with 95% confidence intervals that allow readers to readily assess effects either within the traditional null-hypothesis testing framework or by examining the patterns of differences between means (Loftus, 2002; Loftus & Masson, 1994) .
Mean response time for each condition in the experiment is shown in Figure 1 and the associated priming effects are shown in Figure 2 . The pattern of response times in Figure 1 indicates that subjects were rather slow to respond when the cue was presented at the end of the object noun. We do not have an explanation for this result, although we note three points. First, different groups of subjects were tested in each cue presentation condition, so this outcome might be a peculiarity of this specific set of subjects. Second, a Bayesian analysis found only weak evidence in favor of a model in which the means followed a quadratic trend across cue locations over a model in which no differences between cue location means was assumed, p BIC = .744. Third, the pattern of means across cue presentation locations was not replicated when the same sentences were used in Experiment 2. Therefore, we do not offer any further speculation on this pattern.
The priming effects shown in Figure 2 are of primary interest. They were examined by first testing for an influence of sentence context, averaging across cue presentation locations. A model that assumed a cross-over interaction between sentence context (functional vs. volumetric) and cued action (F-grasp vs. V-grasp), with greater priming when context and action matched, was very strongly favored over a model that assumed no interaction, p BIC > .999.
Follow-up analyses evaluated a model that included a priming effect against a null effect model for each combination of sentence context and action type. Clear evidence favoring the priming effect model was found only when sentence context and action type matched (p BIC > .999 for functional sentences/actions, and p BIC = .992 for Figure 1 . Mean response time in Experiment 1 as a function of sentence context, action type, prime relatedness, and cue presentation position. Error bars are 95% within-subjects confidence intervals appropriate for comparing means in related and unrelated conditions (Loftus & Masson, 1994; Masson & Loftus, 2003) . volumetric sentences/actions). When the context and action were mismatched, the null effect model was moderately favored over the priming effect model (p BIC = .802 for volumetric actions and functional sentences, and p BIC = .788 for functional actions and volumetric sentences).
Next, we examined the pattern of priming across cue presentation locations. Here, our primary interest was in (a) whether priming was sustained or faded as subjects listened to the final clause of the sentence and (b) whether context-specific effects on priming were sustained across the course of the sentence. Figure 2 shows that priming for F-and V-grasps within their matched sentence contexts peaked at some point during the presentation of the object noun. For F-grasps tested in functional sentence contexts, a model in which priming effects were assumed to decrease linearly across cue presentation locations was favored over a model that assumed stable priming across time, p BIC = .866. In addition, context specificity was examined by considering priming effects for F-and V-grasps when actions were cued during the presentation of the object noun versus during the presentation of the final clause of the sentence. When subjects were cued to act while listening to the noun, a model that assumed different amounts of priming for F-and V-grasps was very strongly preferred over a model that assumed equal amounts of priming, p BIC = .992. When subjects were cued during the final clause, however, a model assuming no differences between grasp types was preferred, p BIC = .750.
For V-grasps primed in the context of volumetric sentences, the null model was favored over both a linear (p BIC = .913) and a quadratic model (p BIC = .854) of changes in priming effects across cue locations. The relatively small amount of priming seen with V-grasps may have prevented the emergence of clear evidence for dissipation of this priming over the course of the sentence. Another way of assessing the time course of contextual influences on priming of V-grasps is to examine where during the sentence V-grasps showed more priming than F-grasps (context specificity). of V-grasps over F-grasps was confined to just two cue locations, the end of the object noun and the middle of the final clause. Considering just these two locations, a model assuming a difference in priming between the two grasp types was favored over a model that assumed no such difference, p BIC = .890. Thus, V-grasps were contextually favored over F-grasps by volumetric sentence contexts by the time the end of the object noun was reached, but by the end of the sentence, this advantage was lost (for the end-of-sentence location, a null effect model was favored over a model that assumed a difference between grasp types, p BIC = .788).
An additional question with respect to the time course of priming effects was whether F-and V-grasp action representations might initially compete with one another during the early stages of processing the name of a manipulable object, even when presented in a volumetric context. This possibility was tested by examining priming for F-and V-grasps in volumetric sentences at the first two cue locations (onset and middle of the object noun). Figure 2 indicates that priming was small but very similar for both types of action representation at these locations. A Bayesian analysis indicated that, averaging across the two actions types, a model including an effect of related versus unrelated prime was preferred over a null effect model, p BIC = .926. In support of the idea that priming was equal for the two action types at these cue locations, a null model was preferred over a model that included an interaction between action type and prime, p BIC = .866. Moreover, as indicated above, at the next two cue locations (end of object noun and middle of final clause), the priming effect for volumetric actions was greater than for functional actions.
Discussion
We are concerned with two issues of fundamental relevance to understanding the computational role of Fand V-grasps evoked by words. First, to what extent are these motor representations modulated by the meaning of words in combination? Of special interest here is a verb-noun combination that denotes one or the other kind of grasp action on an object, functional or volumetric. If modulation does occur, then a further question arises: what is the nature of the conceptual structures that influence the dynamic expression of motor resonance? For a sentence of the form John lifted/used the X to produce outcome Y, these structures concern goal states-the kind of movement required to lift or use object X (the proximal goal) and the purpose Y behind this action (the distal goal).
The results of Experiment 1 clearly establish that motor resonance extends beyond the meaning of individual words to the relational content among words in a sentence. The influence of an F-context on V-and F-grasps is straightforward. The V-grasp is completely absent when the context implies using rather lifting to move an object. The F-grasp is strongly present, especially for responses cued early in the word. A more notable finding is the marked enhancement of a V-grasp and diminution of an F-grasp when the sentence implies lifting to move rather than using the object according to its proper function (i.e., a Vcontext). Recall that in the absence of context, the object noun yields sustained priming of an F-grasp for responses cued in three temporal locations: beginning, middle, and end of the word (Bub & Masson, in press ). In a V-context, however, the F-grasp fades away, and for responses cued at the end of a word, no longer exerts a priming effect. Without context, a V-grasp dissipates rapidly after yielding a brief priming effect within a narrow time window around the middle of the word. In a V-context, however, the temporal dynamics of the V-grasp are markedly different. This action representation persists, so that by the end of the word, priming for the V-grasp still occurs despite being absent for the F-grasp.
A sentence implying a V-context of the form John lifted the X to produce outcome Y, then, drives down the activation of the F-grasp, but sustains the V-grasp induced by the verb-noun combination {lift the X}. It is of additional interest that F-and V-grasps compete during the earlier stages of word processing in a Vcontext. Both F-and V-grasps are initially evoked by the noun, but the F-grasp diminishes gradually over time while the V-grasp persists. Because an F-grasp is dominant, the influence of context is slow to resolve the competition between action representations in favor of the V-grasp.
We turn now to a second question: how durable are the context-specific resonance effects that we observe? The answer is again unambiguous. Motor representations arise only briefly to the noun after the verb use/lift and dissipate quickly thereafter. The Fgrasp in an F-context has faded by the time responses are cued at the end of the noun and does not reemerge over the rest of the sentence. The V-grasp has a slightly more gradual decline, because it evolves more slowly than an F-grasp, but clearly is not further triggered by context beyond the initial effect of the proximal goal (John lifted the X).
The evanescence of F-and V-grasps is consistent with much of the literature on motor resonance which reports a similarly brief duration of priming effects induced by action verbs or verb-noun combinations on cued directional movements (e.g., Borreggine & Kaschak, 2006; Zwaan & Taylor, 2006) . We confirm the generality of this result; evoked motor representations are typically not sustained as the meaning of a sentence unfolds. There is reason to assume, though, that the durability of an F-or V-grasp in a given context may depend on whether mental imagery is recruited when subjects listen to a sentence (Barsalou, 2008; Kent & Lamberts, 2008) . A task that requires subjects to explicitly consult a motor image when responding to the meaning of a sentence may entail the preservation of action representations in working memory that are not maintained under more typical listening instructions.
We evaluate this possibility in Experiment 2.
Experiment 2
There is a straightforward way of encouraging subjects to engage in motor imagery. Simply ask them to pantomime their understanding after listening to a sentence. Good evidence that pantomiming an action depends on motor imagery has been reported by Buxbaum, Johnson-Frey, and Bartlett-Williams (2005) . These authors have shown that in patients with ideomotor apraxia, performance on motor imagery tasks is highly correlated with the ability to produce or recognize pantomime. No such correlation exists between motor imagery and performance on tasks that require direct manual interactions with physical objects.
We wish to know whether a more enduring evocation of context-specific motor resonance is produced by the instruction to pantomime a sentence rather than simply attend to the meaning. Cued actions were produced as before, time-locked to one of several possible points in each sentence. Recall that in Experiment 1, we assessed subjects' comprehension on 25% of trials by asking them a question concerning the content of a sentence. We now test comprehension (again on 25% of trials) by requiring listeners to pantomime the action a sentence conveyed.
In Experiment 2a, listeners were simply asked to mimic the action and were given no additional information on what particular form the pantomime should take. This sometimes yielded rather indeterminate responses that appeared to represent both the proximal and distal goals of a sentence. For example, John lifted the cell-phone to clear the shelf might elicit both an inverted power grasp (for lifting a cell-phone) followed by a sweepthen-drop action (to denote clearing a shelf). These mixed pantomimes were counted as correct since we gave no instructions to further constrain the actions that listeners produced. To elicit pantomimed actions more clearly based on the relevant F-or V-grasp, however, subjects in Experiment 2b were asked to demonstrate the hand posture applied to the object mentioned in the sentence.
Method
Subjects. A new sample of 144 subjects was recruited from the same source as in Experiment 1. One hundred twenty of these subjects were tested in Experiment 2a, with 24 subjects randomly assigned to each cue presentation location. The remaining 24 subjects were tested in Experiment 2b which tested only the end-of-sentence location.
Materials and procedure. The same materials and procedure were used for Experiment 2a as in Experiment 1, except that instead of requiring subjects to answer comprehension questions, they were cued on 25% of the trials to pantomime the action described in the sentence that was presented on that trial. As in Experiment 1, the cue to make a pantomime response was presented on the computer monitor after the subject had completed the cued reach and grasp response. The pantomime response was made with the dominant hand but was a true pantomime in the sense that it was executed without making contact with the response apparatus. The experimenter viewed the pantomime response and scored it as correct or incorrect using keyboard input, as was done when judging responses to comprehension questions in Experiment 1. Experiment 2b differed from Experiment 2a in two ways: only the end-of-sentence cue location was tested, and subjects were given more specific pantomime instructions. They were told that when prompted, they were to use a pantomime to illustrate the hand posture implied by the action described in the sentence that had been presented on that trial. Again, no contact with the response apparatus was made when subjects made these hand postures.
Results
As in Experiment 1, errors and spoils were very rare in Experiment 2 (M = 0.4% in each case for Exp. 2a, M = 0.4% for errors and M = 0.1% for spoils in Exp. 2b), so no inferential analyses are reported. The mean percent correct for execution of pantomime responses was 99.3% in Experiment 2a and 97.5% in Experiment 2b. Response times were filtered as in Experiment 1, with the upper bound set at 2,600 ms, causing fewer than 0.5% of trials to be excluded in each version of Experiment 2.
Mean response time in each condition of Experiment 2a and 2b is shown in Figure 3 . For Experiment 2a, we note that the pattern of mean response time does not show the pronounced peak at the third cue location that was seen in Experiment 1. Indeed, a Bayesian analysis of mean response times averaging across context, action, and priming conditions, indicated that a null effect model was very weakly preferred over a model assuming either a linear trend (p BIC = .594) or a quadratic trend (p BIC = .608) for the change in mean response time across cue locations.
Mean priming effects for Experiment 2 are shown in Figure 4 . As in Experiment 1, we first examined the priming data for context specificity, in the form of a cross-over interaction between sentence context and action type, averaged across cue presentation location. For Experiment 2a, the interaction model was very strongly preferred over the null model, p BIC > .999. Clear priming effects were seen when the sentence context and action type matched, as indicated by a strong preference for a model that included a priming effect over a null model for both F-(p BIC > .999) and Vgrasps (p BIC = .972). When the sentence context did not match the action, the null model was preferred (p BIC = .882 for F-grasps, and p BIC = .834 for V-grasps).
Change in priming effects across cue location was examined as in Experiment 1.
For priming of functional actions in functional sentence contexts, a null model was preferred over a model that assumed a linear change in priming across cue locations, p BIC = .885. These results contrast with the effects seen in Experiment 1. For volumetric actions tested in the context of volumetric sentences, a null model was preferred over a model that assumed either a linear (p BIC = .856) or a quadratic (p BIC = .676) change in priming effects across cue locations.
These results for volumetric actions are similar to what was found in Experiment 1. Experiment 2b provided evidence that the effect of context specificity survived to the end of the sentence by producing a robust context by action type interaction, p BIC = .995. The pattern of this interaction was the same as the overall context specificity effect found in Experiment 2a, with priming effects present when the context matched the cued action type (p BIC > .999 for F-grasps and p BIC = .839 for V-grasps). For both action types, the null model was slightly preferred over a model that included a priming effect when the sentence context did not match (p BIC = .790 for F-grasps and p BIC = .622 for V-grasps). The presence of this interaction at the end of the context sentence stands in contrast to the failure to find evidence for context specificity in the final cue location in Experiment 1.
Finally, we checked whether Experiment 2a replicated the evidence seen in Experiment 1 for early competition between F-and V-grasp representations when the name of a manipulable object is presented in a volumetric sentence context. Priming of F-and Vgrasps in that context were compared for the first two cue presentation locations (word onset and middle), as in Experiment 1. A model that included an effect of prime relatedness was preferred over a null model, p BIC = .875, but a null model was preferred over a model that included an interaction effect, p BIC = .873. Thus, as in Experiment 1, both F-and V-grasps were equally primed in the earliest stages of listening to the presentation of the name of a manipulable object, despite the fact that a volumetric context had already been established by the earlier mention of a relevant verb.
Discussion
To generate a pantomime, we assume, requires that the listener construct a motor image of an action described in a sentence. This task-demand radically altered the duration of context-specific effects. The Fgrasp in an F-context is now sustained until the very end of the sentence. Particularly relevant is the outcome of Experiment 2b, where subjects were specifically asked to generate a pantomime that depicted the grasp posture of the motor intention represented in the first part of a sentence. Contextspecific effects on cued actions clearly persisted until the end of the sentence, long after the object noun associated with the F/V-grasp was introduced. The Fgrasp in an F-context endured and dominated the Vgrasp. In a V-context, the pattern reversed; priming effects now revealed the V-grasp to be dominant on termination of a sentence.
Of additional interest is the fact that in a volumetric sentence context, we again observed early competition between F-and V-grasps in response to the object noun, when instructions emphasized motor imagery rather than simply listening to comprehend. Both action representations were evoked at first and appeared to compete. As the influence of context built over time, the F-grasp dissipated while the activation of the Vgrasp was maintained. We return to the theoretical import of this competitive relationship between F-and V-grasps in the final discussion.
Experiment 3
The results of Experiments 1 and 2 support an empirical distinction between short-term and more persistent context-dependent motor resonance effects, depending on whether listeners simply attend to the meaning of a sentence or also engage in mental imagery. But the fundamental question remains: what is the relationship between motor resonance effects and the semantic constituents of a sentence?
We have argued that sentences describing actions on objects are understood in relation to a hierarchy of goal states, and that motor resonance effects depend on the way this hierarchy is navigated by the surface form of the sentence. Introducing the proximal intention by means of a particular verb-noun combination briefly triggers a contextually specific motor representation (e.g., lift/use a cell-phone) that quickly diminishes as the sentence unfolds. Assume, instead, that a distal intention is presented first, before a description of the proximal action.
The listener now immediately understands the abstract goal of the agent (the reason behind the action), and if our supposition is correct, he or she should no longer evoke context-specific motor representations when presented with a description of the action itself. That is to say, given a sentence like To clear the shelf, John lifted the cell-phone, we are claiming that, counterintuitively, there will be no selection of the V-grasp despite the fact that the sentence unambiguously refers to such an action. The reason is that the distal goal, having been established, will preempt the automatic evocation of motor representations associated with the proximal goal (Vgrasp). Thus, the object noun occurring at the end of the sentence is now isolated from motoric influences of the sentence context. We know that an object noun on its own, removed from any context, strongly activates its associated F-grasp (Bub & Masson, in press ), so that we should expect the striking outcome that an F-grasp rather than a V-grasp will be elicited when the distal goal occurs first, even though the sentence definitively implies a V-context.
We have established that a sentence of the form John carried out action X on object Y to accomplish goal Z briefly induces context-specific motor resonance effects. No such context dependency should occur, however, if we simply change the form of the sentence so that the distal goal precedes the proximal action as follows: To accomplish goal Z, John carried out action X on object Y. We investigate this prediction in Experiment 3. The best way of testing our conjecture is to examine the impact of a V-context (rather than an Fcontext) on F-and V-grasps triggered by a noun at the end of the sentence (e.g., To clear the shelf, John lifted the cell-phone). We know that the F-grasp dominates the V-grasp even when the word occurs on its own. An F-context merely adds to this pre-existing dominance, allowing us little room to assess whether contextspecific resonance effects depend on the ordering of proximal and distal goals in a sentence. The impact of a V-context, however, is to drive down the F-grasp and sustain the activation of a V-grasp, in effect reversing the generic pattern. The result of fundamental interest hinges on the dynamics of F-and V-grasps elicited by the target word in a V-context, where the distal goal of the agent is described before a proximal goal. If the Vgrasp emerges as dominant over the F-grasp for cued actions time-locked to the word, we would infer that contextual effects continue to exert their influence. Alternatively, if the F-grasp dominates the V-grasp, as happens for the word in isolation, then we have strong evidence that the context-specific effects observed in Experiments 1 and 2 are abolished by changing the order of goal states in the sentence.
Method
Subjects. Twenty-four new subjects were drawn from the same population as in the earlier experiments.
Materials and procedure. The 144 critical and 12 practice V-contexts from the earlier experiments were used, but they were changed so that the phrase describing the prior intention occurred first, followed by the action itself, as in (7) To clear the shelf, Jack lifted the pen. An additional 144 critical and 12 practice V-contexts were generated using the same sentence structure as that shown in (7), with the prior intention clearly stated at the beginning of the sentence. Across the entire set of sentences, each of the 12 object nouns was used in 24 critical and two practice sentences. The sentence contexts were digitally recorded in a female voice. Only two cue presentation locations were tested: the middle and the end of the object noun. Because there was no manipulation of type of sentence context, the cue location variable was manipulated within subjects, creating a three-factor repeated-measures design with action type, relatedness of the object noun and the cued action, and cue location as the independent variables. As in the earlier experiments, each of the six actions was paired with an equal number of sentence contexts that contained a particular object noun, creating a relatedness proportion of 0.33 and rendering the sentence context unpredictive of the specific action that would be cued. Each action-object pair was tested equally often in each cue location condition.
To ensure that subjects paid attention to the sentence contexts, on 25% of the trials a comprehension question was presented, as in Experiment 1. The procedure was the same as in Experiment 1, except that only two cue positions were used (middle and end of the object noun) and these were manipulated within subjects.
Results
Error and spoil rates (M = 0.3% and 0.1%, respectively) were again very low, so no inferential analyses were applied to these data. Response times were trimmed as in the earlier experiments and values exceeding 1,800 ms (fewer than 0.5% of correct responses) were excluded as outliers.
Mean performance on the question answering task was 96.0%.
Mean response time and priming effect for each condition are shown in Figure 5 . The pattern of means indicates that there was a clear priming effect for Fgrasps at both cue positions, and a much weaker priming effect for V-grasps. This pattern is captured in a model that assumes an interaction between action type and priming condition, averaging over cue position. That model was strongly preferred over a model that assumes no interaction, p BIC = .978. Thus, despite sentence contexts that consistently pointed toward Vgrasps, it was F-grasps that were more strongly evoked during sentence comprehension. This result represents a striking reversal in the pattern of priming for F-and V-grasps, relative to the priming seen in V-contexts in Experiment 1 for subjects who were cued at the end of the noun (see Figure 2 ).
Discussion
Context-specific resonance effects appear to depend on the order of proximal and distal goal states described in a sentence. When the proximal goal occurs before the distal goal (John carried out action X on object Y to accomplish goal Z), Experiments 1 and 2 demonstrate striking contextual modulation of the grasp representations evoked by the noun (object Y). Merely changing the surface form of the sentence in Experiment 3 so that the distal goal of the intended action precedes the proximal goal abolished this effect. This counterintuitive, but theoretically motivated outcome is worth emphasizing. The word cell-phone in a V-context such as To clear the shelf, John lifted the cell-phone, triggers an F-grasp more strongly than a Vgrasp, despite the fact that the meaning of the sentence unambiguously implies lifting rather than using an object! The distal goal preempts activation of the motor representation consistent with the proximal goal described in the sentence, so that whatever action representation is in fact evoked arises from processing the object noun on its own, devoid of contextual influences. As we have already noted, the object noun on its own activates an F-grasp which dominates the Vgrasp (Bub & Masson, in press) . We see exactly this pattern here, where the distal goal occurs first.
From an intuitive standpoint, this outcome appears outlandish. It is surely more reasonable to expect, tout court, that the mental simulation of actions referred to in a sentence would conform to the actions we ourselves carry out in a similar context. This assumption is often either implicitly or explicitly made in the burgeoning neuroimaging literature on the functional relationship between motor cortical activity and language. Speer, Reynolds, Swallow, and Zacks (2009) , for example, infer on the basis of patterns of neural activation that "...brain regions involved in reading action words are some of the same regions involved in performing analogous actions in the real world" (p. 989). The evidence we have obtained bears on the logic of such attempts via neuroimagery to elucidate the nature of motor cortical activation in sentence comprehension. Despite the allure of this pursuit, it remains limited by the fact that there is no way at present to directly infer the content of action representations from patterns of motor cortical activation dynamically evoked during language comprehension.
Our methodological approach reveals considerable subtlety in the evocation of F-and V-grasps as meaning unfolds in real time. Under certain task conditions, it might appear that the listener does indeed engage in a form of motor enactment that transparently mirrors the content of a sentence. But this outcome is hardly true of resonance effects in general. Which representations of action are evoked depends crucially on the way a hierarchically organized motor schema is navigated by the meaning of a sentence. We have argued that under normal listening conditions, the distal goal of a sentence presented first will preempt the subsequent activation of the proximal goal. Embodied human agents will enlist the same identity structure to represent the goal states described in a sentence as they do to represent their own goal-directed behavior. As we claimed, the distal goal in the motor hierarchy is explicitly represented as a general course of action, whereas the proximal goal is not realized until triggered by external events (Juarrero, 2002) . A sentence like To clear the shelf, John lifted the cell-phone, evokes a representation of the distal goal involving a range of possible actions, leaving unspecified the particular action consistent with the proximal goal of picking up a cell-phone. The object noun occurring at the end of the sentence (cell-phone), however, nevertheless will evoke a motor representation as part of its meaning. We have shown previously that such a word on its own automatically yields an F-grasp which dominates the Vgrasp. This is exactly the pattern we see in Experiment 3.
Experiment 4
Given the importance of the contrasting pattern of results found in Experiments 1 and 3--and its counterintuitive character--it would be prudent to replicate this outcome within a single experiment. To that end, in Experiment 4, we introduced a manipulation of sentence type (proximal goal first vs. distal goal first) among V-contexts and again examined priming of F-and V-grasps.
Method
Subjects. Thirty-six subjects were recruited from the same source as in the previous experiments.
Materials and procedure. The 288 critical volumetric sentences from Experiment 3 were used. Two versions of each of those sentences were used, one that conformed to the structure in which the proximal goal was presented at the beginning of the sentence (e.g., John lifted the pencil to clear the desk) and one in which the structure called for the distal goal to be mentioned first (e.g., To clear the desk, John lifted the pencil). The same three functional and three volumetric hand actions and pictures of those actions were used to cue reach and grasp responses as in the previous experiments. Actions were randomly assigned to sentences with the constraint that each action was assigned to four sentences that mentioned a particular object. Two of these sentences had the proximal-goalfirst structure and two had the distal-goal-structure. Only the volumetric action that fit the object mentioned in the sentence was fully compatible with the sentence Figure 6 . Mean response time in Experiment 4 as a function of action type, prime relatedness, and sentence structure. Error bars are 95% within-subjects confidence intervals appropriate for comparing means in related and unrelated conditions. context, and this pairing occurred on 1/6 or 17% of the trials. On all trials, the hand cue was presented immediately after articulation of the object noun was completed. To encourage active listening to the sentence contexts, a comprehension question was asked at the end of a randomly selected set of 25% of the trials. In all other respects, the procedure was the same as in the earlier experiments.
Results
The mean error and spoil rates were again very low (0.3% and 0.1%, respectively) so these data were not subjected to inferential analyses. Response times longer than 3,600 ms (less than 0.5% of trials) were excluded as outliers.
Mean performance on the comprehension questions was 94.4% correct.
The response time mean for each condition was computed for each subject, and the means taken across subjects are shown in Figure 6 . The corresponding priming effects are shown in Figure 7 . In line with expectations from our hypothesis about the influence of a hierarchy of intentions on action representations, it is clear that F-grasps were not primed when the proximal goal was mentioned first, but these actions were strongly primed then the distal goal was mentioned first. V-grasps were expected to show the opposite pattern, and this prediction was upheld to a degree, although the priming effect for volumetric actions was not reliable for sentence contexts in which the proximal goal was mentioned first. Nevertheless, the results of a Bayesian comparison of two models of the pattern of priming effects, a main effect of action type versus a cross-over interaction between action and sentence type, clearly favored the interaction model, p BIC = .952.
Discussion
The pattern of results in Experiment 4 is consistent with the cross-experiment comparison between Experiments 1 and 3, although the priming effect for Vgrasps was small relative to the variability in the data (notice the difference in the size of confidence intervals for the priming effects for the two different sentence structure conditions). The lower stability of response time data in the proximal-goal-first condition is likely due to actions being cued while the sentence was still in progress. When the distal goal was first, and the action cue occurred at the very end of the sentence, the confidence intervals were much smaller, indicating more consistent effects across subjects. To help cope with the relatively noisy data in the proximal-goal-first condition, we report at the end of the next experiment an analysis of data aggregated across multiple experiments to clearly establish a dissociation between sentence structure conditions.
Experiment 5
It might be argued that the lack of priming of volumetric actions when the distal goal is mentioned early in the sentence is a result of the object noun appearing at the end of the sentence. Perhaps a volumetric action representation might be evoked some time after the object noun is presented, as part of comprehension processes that occur at the end of a sentence. Just and Carpenter (1980) identified inference making, inter-clause integration, and other sentence wrap-up processes that occur during reading when the end of a sentence or paragraph is reached. By tracking eye movements during reading, they estimated these operations to require roughly 100-250 ms. If similar processes occur during listening comprehension, there may be operations occurring at the end of hearing a sentence that would elicit volumetric action representations shortly after the time at which we tested for them.
Therefore, in Experiment 5 we replicated Experiment 4 with two changes. First, we used only sentences that presented the distal goal first and had the object noun as the final word in the sentence. Second, presentation of the hand cue was delayed until 500 ms after the object noun had been enunciated, leaving ample time for sentence wrap-up processes to run to completion. If these processes are likely to evoke a volumetric action representation, then we should observe reliable priming of those actions under these circumstances. Alternatively, if the presentation of the distal goal early in the sentence essentially overrides the proximal goal and its associated hand action representations, then we should once again see little or no priming of volumetric actions along with robust priming of functional actions.
Method
Subjects. A group of 24 subjects was sampled from the same source as in the earlier experiments.
Materials and procedure. Only the distal-goalfirst version of the 288 critical sentences from Experiment 4 were used. The same procedure was followed in Experiment 5, except that instead of presenting the hand cue immediately after the object noun had be enunciated, a 500-ms delay intervened between the end of the noun and the onset of the hand cue.
Results and Discussion
Only 3 trials among a total of more than 6,900 resulted in an error or a spoiled response. Comprehension questions were correctly answered on an average of 98.1% of the probed trials.
Response times longer than 2,200 ms were excluded as outliers (less than 0.5% of trials). Mean response time as a function of action type and relationship between action and the object mentioned in the context sentence is shown in Figure 8 . The pattern of means clearly indicates that a priming effect was apparent for functional actions, but not for volumetric actions. A model based on the interaction between action type and prime relatedness was strongly favored over a model that assumed no interaction, p BIC = .974. Moreover, when the data for volumetric actions alone were examined, a null model was preferred over a model that included a priming effect, p BIC = .826. These results indicate that sentence wrap-up processes occurring shortly after the full sentence has been presented do not elicit a volumetric action representation, even though the sentence specifically describes the goal of the action as volumetric in nature.
To clearly establish the dissociation between priming of F-and V-grasps produced by variation in sentence structure, we aggregated the data from the experiments in which subjects read for comprehension (Exps. 1, 3, 4, and 5) and tested the influence of sentence structure on priming. We included data from conditions in which the hand cue was presented either in the middle or at the end of the object noun. Each subject's priming effect for F-and V-grasps was computed and the means of those priming effects are shown in Figure 9 .
The aggregate data show a clear double dissociation inasmuch as priming was significant for Vgrasps only when the proximal goal was mentioned first and for F-grasps only when the distal goal was described first. For some subjects included in this aggregate analysis, sentence type (proximal goal first vs. distal goal first) was manipulated across experiments and so it was a between-subjects factor, but for subjects in Experiment 4 sentence type was a within-subject factor. This data set cannot be analyzed by a standard ANOVA and so we could not apply the Bayesian analysis as we have done in other cases. Therefore, we computed an approximate randomization test based on 100,000 random permutations of the data to determine whether the observed interaction effect seen in Figure 9 was an unlikely outcome (Edgington, 1995; Mewhort, Johns, & Kelly, 2010) . This test produced an estimated probability for the observed interaction (or one more extreme) of p < .001. We also used this test to examine the effect of sentence structure separately for the two action types. For V-grasps, priming was significantly greater when the proximal goal was mentioned first, p = .037, and for F-grasps there was reliably greater priming when the distal goal was mentioned first, p < .001.
The aggregate data are consistent with the proposal that sentence comprehension and associated action representations are guided by a goal hierarchy in which the distal goal has priority (Vallacher & Wegner, 1987) . Once that goal has been established, the more detailed aspects of the actions needed to achieve it appear not to play a significant role in comprehension processes. Instead, conceptual knowledge about the object noun, including functional action representations, contributes to sentence understanding. Mentioning the distal goal first overshadows the detail implied by the proximal goal, at least with respect to basic comprehension of the sentence. In the final experiment, we demonstrate that changing the subject's comprehension objectives produces a substantially different pattern of action priming.
Experiment 6
Notice that two different mechanisms may contribute to context-specific effects when they do occur: motor imagery and the mental simulation of an action. The modulating influence of goal structure was observed when subjects merely attended to the meaning of a sentence without engaging in motor imagery. We now raise a further question of interest. Does motor imagery alter how context-specificity is affected by the ordering of distal and proximal states described in a sentence? The answer promises to yield further insights into the difference between mental simulation and mental imagery as sources of motor resonance. In Experiment 6, we examine whether context-specific effects are reinstated by instructions to pantomime the action in a V-context representing a distal-thenproximal arrangement of goal states.
Method
Subjects. Twenty-four subjects from the same source as in the earlier experiments were tested.
Materials and procedure. The sentences, apparatus, and actions from Experiment 3 were used. The procedure was the same as in Experiment 3, except that the question-answering task was replaced with the requirement on a randomly chosen 25% of trials to pantomime the hand posture implied by the sentence presented on that trial (as in Experiment 2b).
Results
Very few errors or spoils occurred (M = 0.2% in both cases), so we do not report inferential analyses of these data. Subjects responded to the requirement to demonstrate the hand grasp implied by the sentence with near perfect accuracy (M = 98.1%). Response times in the reach and grasp task were filtered as in the earlier experiments, with values greater than 2,400 ms (fewer than 0.5% of correct responses) excluded as outliers.
Mean response time and priming effects are shown in Figure 10 . The results clearly indicate that both Fand V-grasps were primed to the same degree. A Bayesian analysis indicated that there was very strong evidence supporting a main effect of priming, p BIC > .999. Unlike Experiment 3, however, there was no interaction between grasp type and priming, and a Bayesian analysis provided positive evidence in favor of the hypothesis that both grasps showed equal priming, p BIC = .824. 
Discussion
The effect of a V-context should produce greater activation of a V-than an F-grasp, inverting the usual pattern of dominance observed when the word occurs on its own (Bub & Masson, in press ). We found no such pattern of context-specific effects under instructions to mentally image a sentence of the form To accomplish goal Z, John carried out action X on object Y. But neither did we observe a result indicating that instructions to image had no impact at all on the motor representations available to the listener at the end of the sentence. The latter inference would hold if we had observed the usual F-dominance that occurs when a word is processed without any influence of context. Instead, Experiment 6 establishes that under instructions to image, the V-grasp is now as strongly present as the F-grasp, affording an additional clue on the difference between the implicit mental simulation of an action (which we assume takes place when subjects merely attend to the meaning of a sentence) and motor imagery (under instructions to pantomime).
We have argued that no mental simulation of the proximal goal transpires if the distal goal occurs first. To be clear on this point, we are claiming that even an imperative sentence like To clear the shelf pick up the cell-phone, usually will not evoke the proximal goal in the listener until he or she is confronted with the physical parameters of the object in question (Juarrero, 2002; Vallacher & Wegner, 1987) . The intention to clear a shelf admits a variety of possible actions depending on further details of the disposition of objects and their motor affordances. An embodied agent will attend to the distal goal as prepotent and will opt for a particular course of action only when its details are specified by the environment or by mental computation such as imagery. We have already described relevant single-cell recording evidence in support of this theoretical claim (Baumann et al., 2009 ). In addition, we have previously shown that under certain circumstances, a volumetric sentence context does not evoke the relevant proximal action until a picture of the target object is presented (Bub & Masson, 2010) .
The implicit simulation of a sentence describing a hierarchy of actions obeys exactly the same principles as apply to an agent's representation of his or her own motor intentions. Listeners represent the distal goal, which entails a range of vaguely specified possible actions they themselves would be capable of performing. The proximal goal is left unspecified without external constraints. Thus, a sentence that first specifies the distal goal evokes the typical F-dominance of motor representations to the object noun at the end of a sentence (Experiments 3-5; see also Masson, Bub, & Newton-Taylor, 2008) . Because no proximal action is evoked, the meaning of the object noun yields the typical pattern observed when the word is presented in isolation (Bub & Masson, in press) .
If the proximal goal is presented before the distal goal in a volumetric sentence context, the dynamics of comprehension dictate initial activation of a V-grasp. This should occur because the description of the proximal goal will briefly evoke the corresponding action before the listener arrives at the distal goal. Indeed, we observed that this ordering of goal states yielded the expected, short-lived dominance of the Vgrasp over the F-grasp (Exp. 1).
When listeners attend to the meaning of a sentence under instructions to pantomime the described action, the task now demands explicit representation of the proximal action in addition to comprehension of the sentence. Thus, even when the distal goal has been established, the V-grasp should be elicited in response to the noun occurring at the end of a volumetric sentence context. This representation combines independently with the effect of the distal goal, yielding priming for both action types (see Figure 10 ). In essence, the instruction to pantomime evokes through mental imagery a V-grasp representation, while at the same time implicit simulation of the distal goal has no such effect. The F-grasp priming that occurs in conjunction with priming of V-grasps is due to the object noun automatically eliciting its associated functional action representation (see Bub & Masson, in press) .
Our claim that the order of distal and proximal goals in a sentence determines the nature of motor priming is a strong one and can be contrasted with an alternative explanation. Namely, it might be suggested that the difference in the pattern of priming in distal-goal-first sentence contexts under comprehension versus imagery instructions was the result of relatively superficial comprehension operations in the former case. Subjects may have paid less attention to the actor's intent and more to the object noun when reading for comprehension. This tendency would lead to priming being confined to the F-grasp (evoked by the object noun; Bub & Masson, in press ) as seen in (Exps. 3-5). It is not clear, however, why comprehension processes would be superficial with the distal-goal-first sentence structure but not with the proximal-goal-first structure used in Experiments 1 and 4, where V-grasp priming was clearly present. Moreover, the comprehension questions used to encourage subjects to attend to sentence meaning were designed to induce them to integrate the two clauses of the sentences (one describing the distal goal and one describing the proximal goal), no matter the order in which the clauses occurred (see example questions 5 and 6 in the Materials section of Exp. 1). Subjects were very good at correctly responding to comprehension questions (average performance was consistently over 94% correct), indicating that they were reliably comprehending and integrating the information conveyed in the sentence contexts. Therefore, we do not see impoverished sentence processing as a plausible explanation for the differences between the comprehension and imagery instruction conditions.
General Discussion
The goal of the research reported here is to arrive at a deeper understanding of the connection between motor resonance and sentence comprehension. We began this article by noting two opposing interpretations that have fueled much of the debate in the literature on this topic.
One is that action representations are epiphenomenal, arising as an involuntary by-product of language. The alternative to this standpoint is that meaning is grounded in our sensorimotor systems. As Mahon and Caramazza (2008) describe the latter position in their critique of embodied cognition: "The process of retrieving the concept HAMMER would itself be constituted by the retrieval of (sensory and motor) information about how to use hammers (i.e., swinging the arm, grasping the object, coordinating the visuo-motor relationships between the nail and the head of the hammer, etc.)" (p. 60).
Much of the controversy surrounding these extreme viewpoints is fueled by questions dealing with individual words rather than words in context, as the previous example illustrates. Yet the most fundamental clues on the nature of motor resonance are to be found in a methodological approach that allows us to determine how sentence context works to select between motor representations.
Indeed, such a selection process is crucial to any theory of action. Single-cell recording in primates has shown that after extensive training, the AIP simultaneously represents different grasp types (power and precision) associated with an object. Contextual information--mediated by frontal mechanisms--then determines the selection of a particular grasp action from a number of concurrently available response options. As Baumann et al. (2009) write: "AIP neurons... seem to represent visual object features together with the ambiguities of the grip type until they are resolved by further instructions" (p. 395).
The interplay between top-down frontal mechanisms governing the selection of action, and parietal mechanisms that represent multiple ways of interacting with an object is explicitly incorporated into a number of computational models (e.g., Caligiore, Borghi, Parisi, & Baldassarre, 2010; Fagg & Arbib, 1998) . According to the FARS model by Fagg and Arbib (see also Arbib, 2006 , for a recent overview), which is occupied with the control of grasping in primates, the dorsal visual stream in combination with the ventral pathway simultaneously encodes a number of possible actions for a given object, based on the object's identity and volumetric properties. The prefrontal cortex then biases the motor system to choose the action best suited to the current goals of the agent (see also, Cisek, 2007) .
If situational context is a fundamental aspect of goal-directed behavior, then sentence context must play an equally crucial role in the temporal dynamics of motor resonance induced by language. Indeed, an auditory sentence describing a particular action on a manipulable object explicitly depicts a motor intention which must correspond in some way to the contextdependent goal states that listeners themselves experience as embodied agents.
We take this relationship between the semantic content of a language-described action and the conceptual structure of an actual motor intention to lie at the very heart of what must be uncovered if we wish to arrive at a deeper interpretation of mental simulation.
Our methodology allows us to track the dynamic evocation of action representations associated with using (an F-grasp) or lifting (a V-grasp) a manipulable object. For auditory words and no context, we observe the brief simultaneous presence of both F-and Vgrasps, consistent with neurophysiological evidence indicating that objects trigger multiple action representations (Bub & Masson, in press) . A sentence does indeed work to select an F-or V-grasp, depending on whether one or the other action representation is implied by the meaning. An F-context immediately drives down the V-grasp to a word denoting a manipulable object, leaving an F-grasp to dominate. A V-context takes more time to exert its influence, so a delay occurs before the contextually relevant V-grasp emerges as dominant over the F-grasp. The difference between the effects of context on F-and V-grasps makes sense given what we know about the temporal dynamics of these action representations to words on their own. Even without any context, a word evokes an F-grasp that ultimately dominates a V-grasp (Bub & Masson, in press) . Because the competition between Fand V-grasps is intrinsically skewed, a V-context takes some time to "coerce" a motor representation that conforms to lifting rather than using an object (see Pastor-Bernier & Cisek, 2011 , for recent neurophysiolocial evidence on biased competition in premotor cortex).
The bias toward F-grasps for words is consistent with the idea that the function of an object is a crucial aspect of its identity (see also Bub & Masson, in press ). We agree with Jackendoff (2002) who writes in this regard: "I am inclined to see proper function as a basic element of human conceptualization… It is not without significance that children are inclined to ascribe proper functions to more things than adults do… for example, A lake is to swim in, The sun is to keep us warm. A lot of science (including evolutionary theory) has been concerned with removing unwarranted teleology from our understanding of the natural world" (p. 371).
In contrast to words, visual objects show equally strong activation of F-and V-grasps, as we have noted in a previous article . We conjecture that two different sources of information combine to yield a V-grasp for visual objects, offsetting the bias observed for words. A conceptually-driven V-grasp is generated based on the association between actions and the identity of a familiar object. The evidence indicates that the motor system retains this action representation only briefly during word comprehension as the more potent F-grasp builds over time (Bub & Masson, in press ). In addition, though, the conceptually based volumetric properties of a physical object can be augmented by data-driven input from the visual system. Thus, a V-grasp elicited by an object incorporates both stored knowledge of an object's structural attributes, and shape-based information generated directly from perception. In addition to incorporating aspects of shape, the F-grasp is rooted in the functional properties of an object. We have argued elsewhere (Bub & Masson, in press ) that the conceptual representation of an object emphasizes this level of representation. Accordingly, both in word comprehension and in object classification, the F-grasp is sustained over time as part of an object's conceptual identity.
We turn now to consider the theoretical implications of our results, specifically in regard to the computational role of motor resonance in sentence comprehension. Effects of context on F-and V-grasps are: (a) evanescent when they do occur (unless listeners are induced to engage in motor imagery) and (b) strongly dependent on the ordering of proximal and distal goal states in the sentence. The brief duration of motor resonance has been reported in a number of previous publications and two explanations have been offered, neither of which are supported by the present findings. The first account is that listeners shift their perspective away from actions as other aspects of meaning are established over the course of a sentence, limiting the duration of motor resonance (Zwaan & Taylor, 2006) .
A second account is that the constituents of an action are only briefly evoked before they are bound together into a full mental simulation of the meaning of a sentence (Kaschak & Borreggine, 2008) . On this view, resonance effects are actually prevented by the simulation of action because the motor features enlisted for this representation are no longer available to influence cued actions.
The first of these ideas would surely entail that there is no shift in perspective away from an action described at the very end of a sentence. Yet we find no context specificity at this point in comprehension, when the proximal action is introduced after the distal goal. The second explanation blurs the distinction between mental simulation and mental imagery. In fact, the argument by Kaschak and Borregine (2008) includes the notion that motor resonance effects are abolished as soon as mental simulation begins to represent the details of a sentence: "For example, upon reading, 'You dealt the cards...,' there is enough information to know that the action is an 'away' action, but there is not yet enough information to run the full simulation because it is not yet known who is being dealt the cards. The second step in simulating motor actions during language comprehension occurs at or near the completion of the sentence, once enough information has accrued to fully specify the action that is taking place. Here, the active features are bound into a full simulation of the action described by the sentence" (p. 884). On this account, instructions to pantomime a sentence would surely require the binding of motor features in working memory. Motor imagery should therefore prevent the emergence of context-specific effects as meaning unfolds, contrary to what we observe.
What, then, is the nature of the relationship between language comprehension and the mental representation of action? The position often assumed, either tacitly or explicitly, is that motor resonance occurs because access to meaning depends on a literal enactment of sensory and motor representations associated with a word. Mahon and Carammaza (2008) , for example, in considering how the meaning of hammer is represented, reject the idea that "The process of 'concept retrieval' would already be the process of retrieving the sensory and motor information that would directly mediate hammer usage" (p. 60). Clearly, the evidence we have obtained attaches a much deeper significance to motor resonance. It is not the case that motor representations correspond in a straightforward way to the actions conveyed in a sentence. F-and Vgrasps are not themselves the gateway to comprehension. Yet there is a very direct connection between the semantic constituents of a sentence and the motor representations that are enacted or simulated during comprehension.
We have argued on both a priori theoretical (e.g., Juarrero, 2002 , Vallacher & Wegner, 1987 and supporting empirical grounds (e.g., Baumann et al., 2009; Bub & Masson, 2010 ) that in goal-directed behavior a distal goal will preempt the explicit representation of a proximal action. A listener will implicitly simulate such goal-directed behavior described in a sentence using the same hierarchical representation dominated by the distal goal.
A simulation of the distal goal will evoke a range of possible actions, but no specific one will be parameterized until triggered by external events (e.g., the appearance of a relevant object). This will occur even when the sentence mentions a particular proximal goal because the distal goal remains the dominant representation.
Our results are entirely consistent with this interpretation. When the listener simply attends to the meaning of a sentence without any instruction that induces engagement of mental imagery, a V-context with the proximal goal first will briefly select the Vgrasp over the F-grasp. The same context with the distal goal first shows strikingly that the F-grasp now dominates the V-grasp, the pattern observed when an object noun is presented on its own. It follows that presenting the distal goal first preempts the contextspecific grasp representation associated with the proximal goal. In reaching this conclusion, it is necessary to consider an alternative possibility. Namely, evocation of the F-grasp is dominant for a particular object noun, presumably because the function of an object is intimately related to its meaning (Jackendoff, 2002) . When the proximal goal occurs first in a V-context, the V-grasp slowly emerges as the meaning of the sentence unfolds, while the dominant Fgrasp representation fades (see Figure 2) . When the distal goal occurs first, however, listeners adopt a "good-enough" approach to constructing sentence meaning, whereby language comprehension is partial and incomplete (Ferreira, Bailey, & Ferraro, 2002) . Thus, the object noun at the end of the sentence again evokes the dominant F-grasp because the second clause is not properly integrated with the distal goal mentioned in the first clause. We note, however, that resorting to good-enough interpretations appears to require more challenging conditions than those imposed by our sentence structures. In particular, the comprehension errors signaling this type of processing were found with syntactic forms such as garden path sentences and passive sentences structured to violate semantic expectations.
Moreover, subjects made specific comprehension errors under these conditions that indicated they actually did succeed in integrating clauses, but did so by invoking a schema to construct a meaning that was not implied by the sentence (e.g., inferring that a dog bit a man after reading The dog was bitten by the man).
These inferences led to comprehension errors which are the primary evidence for the good-enough nature of comprehension (Ferreira et al., 2002) . In contrast, our sentences consisted of very simple descriptive propositions and our subjects were highly accurate in responding to comprehension questions. These questions included items that required knowledge of the distal goal, the proximal goal, the identity of the agent, and the object. It is very hard to conclude that listeners failed to integrate the distal with the proximal goal and despite this failure were then able to achieve very high accuracy on all these question types. Rather, our results are consistent with the claim that although listeners derive a conceptual integration of sentence constituents, it is at the level of motor representations where the absence of contextual effects can be seen.
Although, as we have argued, a distal goal can be mentally simulated without invoking a particular action representation, it is not possible to mentally image the enactment of a distal goal without also including an explicit representation of a proximal act. Motor imagery is narrowly concerned with the details of an intended motor act, whereas mental simulation can be applied not only to specific actions, but also to abstract goal states that have to do with why rather than how an action is performed.
To summarize, actions conveyed by language share the same hierarchically organized identity structure that human agents apply to identifying their own actions. To put this another way, listeners understand actions described in a sentence via the same dynamic conceptual mechanism they bring to bear on their own actions. They do so automatically and in real time, and in this sense, mental simulation does indeed directly embody the meaning of a sentence. We distinguish this fundamental aspect of motor resonance from the effects of mental imagery, a process that evokes a durable representation of an action that is independent of the action's dynamic identity structure.
Implicitly simulating the distal goal of a sentence places listeners in the same mental state they themselves would embody if they were in place of the protagonist. Such a state affords a readiness to act in a range of possible ways to achieve a particular goal. We understand a sentence like To clear the shelf, John lifted the cell-phone as implying a course of action by John directed toward an abstract goal without representing the details of a specific response. This allows us flexibility, especially when required to understand how actions are configured in an uncertain world. For example, the sentence above might be followed by He carefully slid a spatula underneath the object and deftly flipped it into the waste basket. We immediately appreciate the implications of this sentence by implicitly modeling how a distal goal can yield a particular type of action given a set of external constraints.
Our results highlight the crucial theoretical importance of tracking specific grasp representations as they evolve dynamically in real time. The evidence we have obtained is of particular interest when we consider the methodological challenge imposed by functional imaging research, a widely used approach to investigate the role of motor cortical activity in word and sentence comprehension. Unfortunately, there is at present no way to draw inferences about the dynamics of F-and V-grasps in different sentence contexts just from patterns of activation in motor cortical regions. Nevertheless, a pleasing connection arises between the present findings and recent evidence by Spunt, Falk, and Lieberman (2010) who show, using fMRI, that distinct neural systems are activated depending on whether subjects identify the proximal versus the distal intention behind everyday actions. Questions were designed to emphasize either how or why an action is performed (e.g., how/why do we eat ice cream). The former invokes the proximal level of an action hierarchy, the latter concerns the distal level. Whereas how questions induced activation in motor regions, why questions preferentially activated cortical systems associated with a representation of agency and the ability to reason about mental states. The authors inferred that "... there is more to action than acting. Actions imply both movements of the body and beliefdesire states of the mind. To the extent that individuals represent one or the other, dissociable neural systems are involved" (p. 1597). We concur, though our methodology furnishes additional insights into the temporal dynamics of action representations that unfold when a sentence conveys both distal and proximal levels of a motor intention.
